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SCHOOL BOARD AUTHORITY AND FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS: THE VIEW AFTER BOARD OF EDUCATION,
ISLAND TREES V. PICO
by
JOSEPH D. MCCANN'
In the United States, public education is generally committed to the
authority of local school boards. Traditionally, these school boards have en-
joyed broad - indeed, in some cases absolute - authority in carrying out
their mandate of educating the young. the Supreme Court has, however,
begun to recognize significant limitations on the power of these school boards
with respect to the rights of the students in their charge. One such case ex-
amining the problem of school board authority and the rights of students is
Board of Education, Island Trees v. Pico.I
In Pico a local board of education removed a number of books from its
school libraries, because it claimed the books were "anti-American, anti-
Christian, anti-Semetic (sic), and just plain filthy."2 A challenge to this book
removal by students based on a violation of their rights of free expression set
the stage for a judicial consideration of the proper relationship between local
board authority and the first amendment rights of school children. It is the pur-
pose of this paper to examine this relationship.
This analysis will begin with an examination of the historical bases for the
state's educational authority and the traditional limitations placed on this
authority by the courts. Next, the genesis of students' rights will be reviewed
along with the restrictions the growth of these rights has imposed upon school
board authority. The paper will then turn to the Pico case itself - surveying
the various judicial approaches taken in balancing the interests of school board
authority and students' rights and scrutinizing these approaches for the proper
theoretical framework for student first amendment rights analysis. Finally, the
paper will examine the uneasy resolution of the Pico problem in the Supreme
Court and attempt to draw some broad principles from the fragmented deci-
sion regarding the scope of school board authority.
I. SCHOOL BOARD AUTHORITY
It is proper to begin with an analysis of the bases of school board authori-
ty and the traditional limits courts have placed on the state's power to educate
*J.D., St. John's University School of Law; M.A. State University of New York at Stony Brook; B.A. Marist
College.
1457 U.S. 853 (1982).
'Pico v. Bd. of Educ., island Trees, 474 F. Supp 387, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev d, 638 F. 2d 404 (2d Cir.
1980), affld, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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its youth. Essentially, there are three possible sources for school board authori-
ty: the in loco parentis doctrine, the state's role as parens patriae, and the "in-
doctrination" theory.'
A. In Loco Parentis
The concept of in loco parentis, literally "in the place of a parent,"' was
the early justification for school authority over students. The classic statement
of the doctrine is from Blackstone who noted that a father:
... may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the
tutor or schoolmaster, of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has
such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz.
that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer the pur-
poses for which he is employed.'
This English common law doctrine was adopted in early America when educa-
tion was still a parental responsibility and formal schooling an option.' By
sending his child to school, the parent implicitly delegated his parental powers
of discipline and control to the school officials. When education became com-
pulsory, courts continued to apply the doctrine7 even though it was now no
more than a legal fiction. It is hard to find an implied delegation of authority
when the parent has no realistic choice but to relinquish that authority to the
state. The artificiality of the in loco parentis doctrine becomes particularly ap-
parent when parents themselves question school action.' It should be clear
then that the doctrine is of questionable validity in establishing school board
authority.
'See generally Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Student Conduct
and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. Pa. L. Rev. 373(1969); Comment, School Library Censor-
ship: First Amendment Guarantees and the Students Right to Know, 57 U. Det. J. Urb. L. 523, 525-30
(1980); Comment, Not on Our Shelves: A First Amendment Analysis of Library Censorship in the Public
Schools, 61 Neb. L. Rev. 98, 100-03 (1982); Note, Right of School Board to Remove Books from Secondary
School Libraries - "Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, " 19 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 119, 125-30 (1983); Comment, Censorship in the Public School Library - State, Parent and
Child in the ConstitutionalArena, 27 Wayne L. Rev. 167, 170-71 (1980).
'Black's Law Dictionary 896 (4th ed. 1968).
11 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 453 (W. Lewis ed. 1898).
157 U. Det. J. Urb. L., supra note 3, at 526.
11d.
'See e.g. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). It should be noted that even when students challenge
school actions, it is accomplished through guardians or parents as "next friends." Bd. of Educ., Island Trees
V. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Directors, 638 F.2d 438 (2d
Cir. 1980); Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980); Minarcini v.
Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
It has also been suggested that for a state to properly stand in loco parentis, it should assume the full
duties, responsibilities and obligations of the parents. 57 U. Det. J. Urb. L., supra note 3, at 528-29. In fact,
today the state is assuming more responsibility for the child's welfare than it ever did in the past. With the in-
creased number of single parent or two income homes, the breakdown of the nuclear family, and various
other social changes, the state is assuming control of a child's life earlier and more pervasively than ever
before. The development of state child care programs, the increase in school counseling and psychological
services, and, most recently, suggestions for a longer school year all indicate the fuller role the state plays in
a child's education to the exclusion of the often absent parent.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:2
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An alternate basis for school board authority may be found in the concept
of parens patriae.9 Parens patriae refers to the power of the state as sovereign
to assume a guardianship over persons under a disability.'0 The Supreme Court
has recognized the state's interest as parens patriae in protecting its youth and
its power to enforce this interest even against a parent. Thus, in Prince v.
Massachusetts" the Court upheld the power of the state to convict a Jehovah's
Witness for violation of child labor laws. The defendant had used her niece, a
minor over whom she had custody, to sell religous literature. Unlike in loco
parentis which is based on an implied delegation of authority, the parens
patriae doctrine gives the state the power to intervene for the sake of the child
even when contrary to the parent's wishes. The Court has continued to
recognize this strong interest of the state in the well-being of its youth in
Ginsberg v. New York,'2 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,3 and Federal Com-
munications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation. 4
Notwithstanding the apparent power of the state to act in a child's best in-
terests even when contrary to the parent's wishes, most of the cases employing
the doctrine invoke parens patriae to support rather than derogate parental
authority. In Ginsberg, for instance, the Court noted "that parents and others,
teachers for example, who have this primary responsibility for children's well-
being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that
responsibility."'5 Similarly, in Pacifica Foundation, the Court found that both
"the government's interest in the 'well-being of its youth' and in supporting
-'parents' claim to authority in their own household' justified the regulation of
otherwise protected expression."' 6 Even Prince, while finding the state's in-
terest in protection of the child superior to that of the custodial aunt, recog-
nized that "[ilt is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.""
'ranslated by Black's Law Dictionary 1269 (4th ed. 1968) as "'[flather of his country" or "parent of the
country."
"*ld. See 19 Wake Forest L. Rev., supra note 3, at 129-30.
11321 U.S. 158 (1944). In Prince the Court also recognized that state authority over minors is broader than its
authority over adults. Id. at 168.
12390 U.S. 629 (1968). The Court recognized a state's "independent interest in the well-being of its youth" in
controlling sale of the material determined to be obscene for minors. Id. at 640.
13422 U.S. 205 (1975). The Court noted that a state would be able to protect minors even from material
within first amendment protection but only in "relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances." Id. at
212-13.
"438 U.S. 726 (1978). The Court, here, agreed that the FCC could control the time that material that was of-
fensive, but not obscene, could be broadcast over public airways. This state action was proper in order to
protect youth.
"390 U.S. at 639.
16438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) quoting from Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639, 640 (1968).
17321 U.S. at 166.
Fall, 19841
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In addition, a number of Supreme Court cases have delineated the in-
herent limits of the state's power as sovereign to act against a parent's wishes
for the perceived good of the child. In Meyer v. Nebraska8 and its companion
case Bartels v. Iowa,9 the Court invalidated state attempts to prohibit the
teaching of foreign languages in any school, public or private, to students
below the eighth grade. The Court determined that the state could not in-
terfere with the liberty interests of teachers to instruct in a foreign language or
parents to hire the teachers for that purpose. 0
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,2' the Court invalidated an Oregon statute
requiring that all children between the ages of eight and sixteen attend public
school. Relying on Meyer,22 the Court found the act "unreasonably interferes
with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing ...of
children under their control. -3 The Court noted that "[tihe child is not the
mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for addi-
tional obligations.
More recently, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,2" the state argued the concept of
parens patriae in requiring school attendance up to the age of sixteen for all
children within its borders.26 The Amish parents convicted under the com-
pulsory attendance statute used the First Amendment free exercise of religion
clause in defense. The Court held that this asserted interest of the parents
outweighed the state's claim of power under the doctrine of parens patriae to
extend the benefit of secondary education to children regardless of their
parents' wishes.27 In so holding, it limited the application of the doctrine as
outlined in Prince,28 and quoted from Pierce v. Society of Sisters29 with ap-
proval.30 The Court noted that the "holding in Pierce stands as a charter of the
rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children."'"
18262 U.S. 390 (1923).
9262 U.S. 404 (1923).
21Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at, 400.
21268 U.S. 510 (1925).
-262 U.S. 390 (1923).
p268 U.S. at 534-35.
21d. at 535.
-406 U.S. 205 (1972).
"Id. at 229-34.
YThe Court refused to address the problem of a possible conflict between the rights of the parents and the
rights of the children themselves. Id. at 230-32. The dissent of Justice Douglas pressed for consideration of
the rights of the children as well as those of the parents and the state. Id. at 241-46.
-321 U.S. 158 (1944).
29268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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C. The Indoctrination Theory
Plainly, the power of the state as sovereign to act for the benefit of its
youth is severely limited whenever it comes in conflict with the rights of
parents. Nevertheless, the state's role in education should not be limited mere-
ly to the power it has as sovereign pursuant to the doctrine of parens patriae.
As educator, the state has an "indoctrinative" function. The Court pointed out
this function in Ambach v. Norwick" where it emphasized the role of public
schools in "inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a
democratic political system."" Similarly, in Brown v. Board of Education" the
Court outlined the importance of public education in American life:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great ex-
penditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the impor-
tance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the perfor-
mance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed
forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment.35
It seems clear that this "indoctrinative" function, sometimes termed the
prescriptive model of education,36 plays a larger role the younger the student is.
Educators must be more selective in choosing among concepts to convey and
skills to teach in elementary and secondary schools than they would be in col-
lege and post-graduate studies. At the college level at least: "The classroom is
peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon leaders
trained through a wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which dis-
covers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection."'37 Notwithstanding this broad policy statement, few
are willing to invalidate "any kind of authoritative selection" of suitable con-
3441 U.S. 68 (1979).
"Id. at 77.
'347 U.S. 483 (1954).
"Id. at 493.
"The prescriptive and analytic models of education are differentiated as follows:
In the prescriptive model, information and accepted truths are furnished to a theoretically passive, ab-
sorbent student. The teacher's role is to convey these truths rather than to create new wisdom. Both
teacher and student appear almost as automatons. Analytic education, however, signifies the ex-
amination of data and values in a way that involves the student and teacher as active participants in
the search for truth. While these polar models represent only a theoretical paradigm that can never
exist in pure form, we have traditionally conceived of pre-college public education as essentially
prescriptive, and college and post-graduate studies as analytic.
Goldstein, Reflections on Developing Trends in the Law of Student Rights, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 612, 614
(1970).
"Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (citations omitted). Keyishian dealt with a refusal of
college instructors to sign loyalty certificates pursuant to New York's Feinberg Law. The Court found the
law unconstitutional based partly on its concern for the academic freedom of teachers.
Fall, 19841
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cepts and materials when addressing the role of elementary and secondary
schools. This is traceable to the indoctrinative function of education at that
level ."
It is very difficult to logically differentiate between the parens patriae doc-
trine and the indoctrination theory unless one accepts a division of roles when
the state acts with respect to its youth. In Pico39 Justice Rehnquist's dissent
argued for recognition of the distinction between the state acting as sovereign
(parens patriae) and as educator (indoctrination). He noted "that the govern-
ment may act in other capacities than as sovereign, and when it does the first
amendment may speak with a different voice."" He then cited examples of less
strict First Amendment limitations applied when the state acts as employer4 or
as property owner42 rather than as parens patriae. Summing up, Justice Rehn-
quist stated:
I think the Court will far better serve the cause of First Amendment
jurisprudence by candidly recognizing that the role of government as
sovereign is subject to more stringent limitations than is the role of
government as employer, property owner, or educator. It must also be
recognized that the government as educator is subject to fewer strictures
when operating an elementary and secondary school system than when
operating an institution of higher learning."3
By drawing this distinction between government's sovereign and educa-
tional roles, Justice Rehnquist created a theoretical framework for the axiom
recognized in varying degrees by all who sat in judgment on the Pico issue -
that the state as educator, especially at the elementary and secondary levels,
must be granted great latitude in preparing students for future life.
Of course, the line between state as sovereign and state as educator is a
blurred one, but as a general proposition the nearer one gets to the grassroots
of the educational process, the less likely the courts are to intervene. It is sug-
gested that this judicial reticence is due to an unarticulated perception that at
the grassroots level the state is acting in its role as educator rather than as
sovereign. Thus, the legislation attacked by the Court in Meyer," Pierce,4"
3 Significantly, none of the thirteen judges who examined the Pico situation were willing to reject this indoc-
trinative function of public education on the secondary level.
"457 U.S. 853, 908-10 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
'°ld. at 908.
"Pickering v. 1d. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
"
2Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966).
43457 U.S. at 920.
"262 U.S. 390 (1923) (prohibition against teaching foreign languages in any schools, public or parochial, to
students below the eighth grade).
'268 U.S. 510 11925) Irequirement that all school age children attend public schooll.
[Vol. 18:2
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Yoder and Epperson v. Arkansas"7 was enacted by state-wide legislatures to
deal with broad social issues in the educational field. But when one reaches
down to the day to day operations of schools by local authority and especially
to the actual learning process in the classroom, there is an increased judicial
reluctance to intervene.
This judicial reticence may be due in part to the fact that local school
boards are in many ways the most representative of our institutions. In his
Pico dissent, Justice Powell noted that "[sjchool boards are uniquely local and
democratic institutions" with "only one responsibility: the education of the
youth of our country during their most formative and impressionable years.""0
Justice Powell stressed that:
[T]he governance of elementary and secondary education traditionally
has been placed in the hands of a local board, responsible locally to the
parents and citizens of school districts. Through parent-teacher associa-
tions (PTA's), and even less formal arrangements that vary with schools,
parents are informed and often may influence decisions of the board. Fre-
quently, parents know the teachers and visit classes. It is fair to say that
no single agency of government at any level is closer to the people whom
it serves than the typical school board. 9
Certainly, this accessibility of the school board members to the people
whom they serve is one reason for judicial reluctance to intervene with their
decisions. When one deals with a school board, one generally deals with friends
and neighbors in a local setting." When one is affected by a law of the state
legislature, there is the perception of the individual facing a contest against the
monolithic giant of the state.
Partly because of the perceived responsiveness of local school boards to
the needs of parents in the community, parental challenges to general cur-
riculum, courses and books normally fail.5' However, the authority of school
boards to operate in the process of educational indoctrination even when con-
trary to parental wishes is further bolstered by the fact that these boards nor-
mally only act in educational matters upon the advice of professional staff.
Practically, school boards seldom actually choose books, materials or cur-
riculum. The professional staff does this, and the board approves their deci-
406 U.S. 205 (1972) (compulsory attendance requirement in conflict with free exercise of religion clause).
7393 U.S. 97 (1968) (prohibition of the teaching of evolution in public schools, and colleges and universities
supported by public funds).
48457 U.S. at 894.
491d.
'This is certainly less so when dealing with centralized city school districts, but even the largest cities, New
York City for example, recognize the desirability of local control for the most basic educational functions of
its schools.
"See Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp 340 (D. Md. 1969), affd. 428 F. 2d 471 (4th Cir.l. cert.
denied. 400 U.S. 942 11970).
Fall, 19841
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sions. Since the professional staff can generally claim a degree of academic
freedom in their educational decisions, 2 the school board basks in the glow of
this first amendment right of its staff and it reflects upon their decisions
thereby shoring up their authority. 3
While it is probably true that boards of education are uniquely represen-
tative of their constituents, this does not alleviate the possibility of local boards
trampling on the rights of some parents in carrying out the will of the majority.
It might be argued that courts are somewhat too reticent in this area since the
Bill of Rights exists to protect the minority from the tyranny of the majority.
Nevertheless, courts tend to heed the admonition of Justice Fortas in Epperson
v. Arkansas54 when called upon to examine state action in its indoctrinative ed-
ucational role: "By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to
the control of state and local authorities. Courts do not and cannot intervene
in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school sys-
tems and which do not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional
values."55
Due to the judicial perception that school boards are uniquely represen-
tative of parental wishes in their role of indoctrinating students with communi-
ty values, courts are reluctant to override school board decisions on basic
educational matters. However, school boards represent parents and other
voting community members; school boards do not represent children except to
the degree that their interests coincide with the wishes of their parents. It is the
recognition that school children also have constitutional rights in potential
conflict with school board authority that is the basis of the next section.56
II. STUDENT CHALLENGES To SCHOOL BOARD AUTHORITY
While most challenges to school board authority have been built on the
rights of parents," the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
2For a discussion of academic freedom see generally Schauer, School Books. Lesson Plans and the Constitu-
tion, 78 W. Va. L. Rev. 287 (1976); Developments in the Law- Academic Freedom. 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1045
11968).
One commentator has suggested that the right of academic freedom emanates from various constitutional
provisions, but particularly from the first amendment. T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression
613 (1970).
"For a situation where the academic freedom of teachers was forced to yield to the statutory power of the
school board in determination of books for classroom use, see Carey v. Bd. of Educ., Arapahoe, 598 F.2d
535 (10th Cir. 1979l. It is perhaps significant that the Arapahoe board did not short-circuit its regular policy
of book review as the Island Trees board did in Pico.
1'393 U.S. 97 (1968).
1d. at 104.
"6n closing this section on school board authority, it should be noted that the Court still ascribes to the belief
that the primary role of public education is indoctrinative - that it exists for the "preservation of a
democratic system of government," that it is "the primary vehicle for transmitting 'the values on which our
society rests,"' and that it "provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive
lives to the benefit of us all." Myler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (citations omitted).
"See discussion in last section.
[Vol. 18:2AKRON LAW REVIEW
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Community School District58 opened up the litigation arena to challenges
based upon the rights of children in the school environment. 9 In Tinker Justice
Fortas, speaking for the majority, quoted from West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette' where the Court said:
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the
citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures - Boards of Educa-
tion not excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly
discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the
limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for citizen-
ship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the
individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach
youth to discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes.6'
The Court in Tinker then went on to proclaim what might be called the
manifesto of student rights in the first amendment area:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over
their students. Students in school as well as out of school are "persons"
under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which
the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obliga-
tions to the State. In our system, students may not be regarded as closed-
circuits recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate.
They may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are
officially approved. In the absence of a specific showing of constitutional-
ly valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom
of expression of their views.62
The language that students are "'persons' under our Constitution" and
may not be treated "as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State
chooses to communicate" may seem to sound the death knell of the indoc-
trinative powers of local boards of education. However, the facts of the case
and later limitations upon student rights set out further on in the opinion con-
-393 U.S. 503 (1969).
"
9As noted in the last section, most challenges to school board authority have been concerned with the nur-
turing role of the parent. The first amendment free exercise cases in particular are more often concerned
with avoidance of state interference with parental indoctrination of their beliefs into their children.
Wisconin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). (See dissent of Justice Douglas in Yoder attacking the Court's
failure to consider the first amendment rights of the children in that case. 406 U.S. at 241-246). However,
one pre- Tinker decision is notable for finding the children themselves entitled to equal protection of the laws
pursuant to the fourteenth amendment. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Before Pico, the most
significant post-Tinker decision on students rights was the due process case of Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975).
-'319 U.S. 624 (1943).
61393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) quoting from West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637
(1943).
61393 U.S. at 511.
Fall, 19841
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strict the reach of the quoted passage considerably.
Tinker involved a student challenge to a school regulation prohibiting
students from wearing black arm bands in school under threat of suspension.
The arm bands were worn to protest the Vietnam War. The Court found the
wearing of the arm bands to be "the type of symbolic act that is within the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment. '63 After the statement quoted above
that minor students do have constitutional rights even within the school en-
vironment, the Court went on to recognize that these rights might be limited
by the school's need to function effectively. In line with this, the Court pointed
out that a student cannot "materially and substantially interfere with the re-
quirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school."" Since
discipline exists primarily to create a structured environment within which the
school's indoctrinative function may be carried out,65 and since the facts of the
case did not involve interference with the more substantive elements of educa-
tion (e.g., curriculum, textbooks, etc.), Tinker did not cut as broad an inroad in-
to school board indoctrinative authority as may at first appear.6
There is, however, still much debate as to the scope of children's rights.
One view holds that the essential difference between children and adults
should be recognized, and children should only be granted rights after their ap-
propriateness for a particular set of circumstances is demonstrated.67 Other-
wise, their rights must yield to the nurturing role of their parents or society.
The converse of this point of view is that children have the same full spectrum
of rights that adults enjoy since they too are "persons" under the Constitution.
Proponents of this view feel that students are presumptively entitled to full
constitutional rights unless special circumstances justify their curtailment.68
While the expansive language of the Tinker opinion seems to indicate an ac-
ceptance of the second view, lower courts still show a reluctance to give stu-
dent rights pre-eminence over traditional school board authority even in areas
only peripherally related to the board's indoctrinative function.69 Moreover,
the Supreme Court, itself, handed down the feebly distinguished holdings of
311d. at 505.
64Id. at 509 quoting from Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
"Discipline and structure are less critical at the analytic levels of education (see note 35), because there free-
flowing inquiry is encouraged with the main control of the student being self-discipline. Interestingly
enough, even at the elementary level, progressive schools of education emphasize the analytic model over
the prescriptive, and simultaneously downplay discipline and structure in the learning environment.
"Justice Black in his dissent in Tinker had grave misgivings about the Court's creation of students' rights
suggesting the students were not ready for this degree of liberty and that it would only encourage their de-
fiance of teachers. 393 U.S. at 515-26 (Black, J., dissenting).
"See 27 Wayne L. Rev., supra note 3, at 171-72 & nn. 27-30.
"Id.
"See discussion of hair length cases in J. Hogan, The Schools, the Courts, and the Public Interest 96-108
(1974), and discussion of student newspaper cases in A. Levine, The Rights of Students: The Basic ACLU
Guide to a Student's Rights 31-41 (1973).
[Vol. 18:2
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Goss v. Lopez70 and Ingraham v. Wright' in the area of students' due process
rights thus demonstrating its own confusion over the proper premise with
which to begin children's rights analysis. In Board of Education, Island Trees
v. Pico," the Court had the opportunity to establish the proper premise for
children's rights analysis, but the fractured decision gave no guidance on the
problem.
I11. BOARD OF EDUCATION. ISLAND TREES V. Pcol 3
A total of thirteen federal judges ' heard the question of whether sum-
mary judgment should be granted to the school board in the Pico case. Eleven
of them felt compelled to write opinions. Seven of the thirteen determined
there was a need for a trial on the school board's action ",n removing books
from the school libraries, while the remaining six believed the school board was
entitled to summary judgment. In the Supreme Court itself the split was five to
four in favor of remanding for trial, but even the majority decision was
fragmented into three separate opinions. It was hoped that Pico would clarify
the relationship between students' rights and school board authority, but in
many ways it only muddied the waters.
A. The Facts
In September 1975, three members of the board of education of the Island
Trees Union Free School District attended a conference sponsored by Parents
of New York United (PONY-U), a conservative parents organization." At the
conference, the board members received a list of books found "objectionable"
by PONY-U complete with excerpts and editorializing by the organization.76
Over the next few months, board members found nine of these books in the
high school library, one in the junior high school library and one being used in
the twelfth grade curriculum." The board directed the removal of the eleven
m4 19 U.S. 565 (1975) temporary suspension of a student from public school requires notice and an informal
hearing).
71430 U.S. 651 (1977) (corporal punishment of a student requires neither notice nor a hearing).
2457 U.S. 853 (1982).
11474 F. Supp. 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), affd, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)
'Actually, the first judge to hear the case was to be a New York State Supreme Court Justice as the plain-
tiffs originally filed for injunctionary and declaratory relief in the state court. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees v.
Pico, 474 F. Supp. 387, 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). However, the defendant school board removed to federal
court. The parties' tactics may indicate that they both felt the Second Circuit decision in Presidents Council
v. Community School Bd., 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972), would be controlling. In-
deed, Judge Pratt of the district court decided it was. 474 F. Supp. at 397.
"1474 F. Supp. at 389.
'Pico v. Bd. of Educ., Island Tress Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d 404, 407-08 (2d. Cir. 1980).
"474 F. Supp. at 389. The nine books found in the high school library were: I) Slaughter House Five, by
Kurt Vonnegut Jr., 2) The Naked Ape, by Desmond Morris, 3) Down These Mean Streets, by Piri Thomas,
4) Best Short Stories By Negro Writers, edited by Langston Hughes, 5) Go Ask Alice (anonymous), 6)
Laughing Boy, by Oliver LaFarge, 7) Black Boy, by Richard Wright, 8) A Hero Aint Nothing But A Sand-
which, by Alice Childress, and 9) Soul On Ice, by Eldridge Cleaver. The book found in the junior high school
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books from the school libraries in February 1976, but was reminded by the
superintendent that it was board policy to appoint a book committee to make
recommendations before the board took action.78 Nevertheless, on March 3 the
board president issued a memorandum to the superintendent "reiterating the
board's desire that all copies of the libary books in question be removed from
the libraries to the board's office.' '
79
When the board's actions in removing the books became known, it issued
a press release stating that they had learned of books which were "anti-Amer-
ican, anti-Christian, anti-Semetic (sic), and just plain filthy" at the PONY-U
conference, and that some books had been removed by the board for review."0
The board noted that: the books do, in fact, contain material which is offensive
to Christians, Jews, Blacks, and Americans in general. In addition, these books
contain obscenities, blasphemies, brutality, and perversion beyond
description."
The press release then stressed the school board's role as an indoctrinator
of community values and its position as moral guardian of the children of the
community, while simultaneously denying that the board was "banning" or
"burning" books:
This Board of Education wants to make it clear that we in no way are
BOOK BANNERS or BOOK BURNERS. While most of us agree that
these books have a place on the shelves of the public library, we all agree
that these books simply DO NOT belong in school libraries, where they
are so easily accessible to children whose minds are still in the formulative
stage, and where their presence actually entices children to read and savor
them. As U.S. Commissioner of Education, T.H. Bell, has said, "Parents
have a right to expect that the schools, in their teaching approaches and
their selection of instructional materials, will support the values and stan-
dards that their children are taught at home. And if the schools cannot
support those values, they must at least avoid deliberate destruction of
them."
We who are elected by the community, are the eyes and ears of the par-
ents. It is our duty, our moral obligation, to protect the children in our
schools from this moral danger as surely as from physical and medical
dangers.82
The school board closed by emphasizing that they remained the "faithful
library was A Reader for Writers, edited by Jerome Archer, while The Fixer, by Bernard Malamud was the
book used in the twelfth grade literature curriculum.
78638 F.2d at 408-09.
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Watchdogs" of their community and that they would make the removed books
available for inspection by "the UNbelievers."'
On March 30, 1976 the board appointed a book review committee com-
posed of four parents and four staff members, none of whom were librarians."'
Nevertheless, the committee recommendations were substantially ignored by
the board. It decided to return two books to the shelves, one without restric-
tions" and the other to be available to students with parental permission, 6 but
to ban the other nine from the school libraries. The president of the board ex-
plained that the ban prohibited teacher assignments of the books even as sug-
gested reading, but would allow for discussion of the books in class.87
B. The District Court Decision
The students brought the suit initially in New York State Supreme Court,
but the defendants successfully removed to federal court.8 Judge Pratt of the
district court found the Second Circuit decision in Presidents Council, District
25 v. Community School Board No. 2589 controlling in Pico and refused to
follow a Sixth Circuit case" and two district court cases9 which had limited the
authority of boards of education to remove books from school libraries.92 The
court rejected any concept of a library book acquiring "tenure"" once shelved,
and instead applied the Epperson test" that the Second Circuit had used in
Presidents Council." The district court determined in Pico that it could not in-






i7474 F. Supp. at 391.
"Id. at 389. See note 74, supra. The complaint set out five separate causes of action, but Judge Pratt pared it
down to one. He denied the students standing to assert the academic freedom of librarians as a cause of ac-
tion under either the United States or New York State constitutions. He also determined that the students'
claims of freedom of speech under both the federal and state constitutions were governed by the same prin-
ciples and so were really one cause of action. Finally, he noted the allegation of this constitutional violation
was not really a separate claim from the claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. 11983 is actually nothing more than a
statute providing a remedy for separate and distinct constitutional deprivations). Id. at 394.
-9457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
*Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
"Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979); Right To Read Defense Committee v.
School Committee, 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
2For a careful analysis of all the key circuit and district court cases on the book banning issue see 61 Neb. L.
Rev., supra note 3, at 116-32.
"1474 F. Supp. at 395.
""By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities.
Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school
systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values." Epperson v. Arkansas.
393 U.S. at 104 (full cite given in footnote 54).
"1457 F.2d at 291 (full cite given in footnote 89).
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not been "sharply and directly implicated" as required by Presidents Council
and Epperson.96 The court refused to find that students had a "right to receive"
information in the school library or that this right was violated by content-
based removals of library books.97 In short, the district court came down heavi-
ly in favor of protecting the indoctrinative role of the board of education,9" and
recognized that this of necessity entailed control of the content of material
made available:
Availability of funds, shelf space and personnel are all significant, but the
principal reason for selecting and keeping books is their content. Indeed,
in deciding what books to place in a school library a school board not only
may, but must choose on the basis of content; to do less would be to
neglect their statutory duty.99
C. The Second Circuit Decision
Judge Pratt granted summary judgment to the Island Trees Board of
Education, but this was reversed on appeal to the Second Circuit which
remanded for trial."w) All three members of the panel wrote separate opinions.
Judge Sifton, a district judge sitting by designation, wrote for the majority.
After a careful recitation of the facts, he seemed to appreciate the distinctive
role of the government as educator by stating that the "application of the pro-
hibitions of the first amendment to secondary school education presents com-
plexities not encountered in other areas of government activity."'' He noted
that "a principal function of all elementary and secondary education is indoc-
trinative - whether it be to teach the ABC's or multiplication tables or to
transmit the basic values of the community."'0 2 Nevertheless, he pointed out
that students have First Amendment rights which require breathing room to
avoid a "chilling effect" upon their exercise.13 He tried to balance the com-
peting interests by noting that the "everyday administration of a school's cur-
riculum or a school library does not, either directly or indirectly, impinge on
the free expression of ideas." 104 Therefore, more than a bare allegation of book
removals from the school library would be necessary to establish the prima
474 F. Supp. at 397.
'Id. at 396. This right to receive information was expounded by the Sixth Circuit in Minarcini, 541 F.2d at
583, and built on the concept delineated by the Supreme Court in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
"It should be noted that Judge Pratt believed that the removal of the books reflected "a misguided educa-
tional philosophy," but that this decision was the board's not the court's. 474 F. Supp. at 397.
"Id. at 396. The New York Education Law imposes a duty upon school boards to determine books to be
used by the children within their districts. N.Y. Educ. Law § 1709 (McKinney 1969).
'638 F.2d at 419.
"'Id. at 412.
'"' Id.. quoting James v. Bd. of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir.) cert. denied. 409 U.S. 1042 (l972.








Judge Sifton did determine, however, that a prima facie case could be
made out in this case. The "unusual and irregular intervention in the school
libraries' operations by persons not routinely concerned with such matters"
combined with circumstances that raise "grave questions" of the scope and in-
tentions of the board in removing the books created an inference strong
enough to state a prima facie case and shift the burden of persuasion to the
defendants." The judge acknowledged, however, that the school board might
defend by claiming a material and substantial interference with its educational
functions pursuant to the test laid out in Tinker.'°7 But Judge Sifton then took
the Tinker test much further toward judicial intervention in school board af-
fairs than the Supreme Court had ever envisioned. He demanded both "narrow
specificity" in the book review criteria and "sensitive tools" in the removal pro-
cedures to avoid overbreadth. °8 It is submitted that this amounted to a broad
inroad upon school board discretion that was entirely unwarranted given the
presumption that the board acts in its indoctrinative role for the good of its
charges. Finally, Judge Sifton argued that the plaintiffs were entitled to a trial
on the issue of motive - i.e. "an opportunity to persuade a finder of fact that
the ostensible justifications for the defendants' actions ... were simply pretexts
for the suppression of free speech."' 9
Judge Newman concurred in result, but did not elaborate on the complex
procedural aspects that Judge Sifton developed at length in his opinion.
Rather, Judge Newman, after recognizing the inculcatory function of
schools,"' set out in broad policy terms the importance of avoiding the percep-
tion in students that some ideas can and will be suppressed."' Toward this end,
he saw a key distinction between a refusal to acquire a book and a decision to
remove one from the library - especially when made by leading school of-
ficials."' He believed the latter event was charged with symbolic significance
and more likely to convey to students the impression that certain ideas were
prohibited. Thus, schools would act to suppress independent thought, rather
than encourage it."' As a result of these views, Judge Newman determined the
case should go to trial on the issue of the defendants' motives."4
O"'Id
"'Id. at 414-15.
"'Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. at 512-13.






"'Id. at 436-438. Given Judge Newman's premise that the real danger involves the perceptions of the
students with respect to witnessing book removals, it is hard to understand why he believed the key issue to
be determined at trial was the defendants' motivation. Even if the defendants acted with the most innocent
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Judge Mansfield registered a vehement dissent in Pico"5 attacking the ma-
jority for overruling the "indistinguishable" decision of Presidents Council." 6
He stated that no first amendment rights were infringed by removal of library
books containing vulgarities and indecent matter which made them educa-
tionally unsuitable for children." 7 To demonstrate his view that they were vul-
gar and indecent, he set out excerpts of the works in the margin of his
opinion."' He noted that it was the statutory duty of the board to prescribe ap-
propriate books for its schools,"9 and argued, somewhat unconvincingly, that
the board did not act arbitrarily but "carefully, conscientiously and responsibly
after according due process to all parties concerned."'20 Judge Mansfield
stressed the importance of granting broad discretionary authority to school
boards to ensure that their mandate would be carried out.' He underscored
this view that boards of education must have broad discretion by quoting from
a Seventh Circuit decision upholding a book removal from a school library:
The rule [is] that complaints filed by secondary school students to contest
the educational decisions of local authorities are sometimes cognizable
but generally must cross a relatively high threshold before entering upon
the field of a constitutional claim suitable for federal court litigation. Such
a balance of legal interests means that panels such as the Warsaw School
Board will be permitted to make even ill advised and imprudent decisions
without the risk of judicial interference.'
His view was that students were entitled to "reasonable" freedom of expres-
sion, but that school authorities had the power to remove library books that
are "rationally" found to be unsuitable for educational purposes.'
All of the members of the Second Circuit panel in Pico recognized in vary-
ing degrees the broad scope of state authority when acting as educator to en-
sure proper performance of its indoctrinative functions. At the one extreme,
Judge Mansfield argued that school board decisions in their indoctrinative role
need only be "rational" since students are only entitled to "reasonable" free-
dom of expression.'24 At the other end of the spectrum, Judge Sifton, after pay-
of motives, it would not change the perception of the students at the time of the removals that ideas can be
suppressed. For an analysis of the motivation factor in the Pico case, see Note, Judicial Clairvoyance and
the First Amendment: The Role of Motivation in Judicial Review of Book Banning in the Public Schools.
1983 U. Ill. L. Rev. 731 11983).
"'638 F.2d at 419-32.
"'457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
"'638 F.2d at 419.
'Bid at 419-22.
"'See note 99, supra.
'638 F.2d at 432.
"'Id. at 425.
1'21d. at 428, quotingftom Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300. 1306 (7th Cir. 1980).
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ing lip service to the importance of "cautious deference to the expertise of ed-
ucational officials within the academic environment,"'25 shackled local school
boards to strict procedural safeguards in order to avoid the threat of chilling
students' first amendment rights. Plainly, even Judge Mansfield did not believe
school boards were entitled to absolute authority over their charges. Nor did
Judge Sifton determine that secondary level students had first amendment
rights coextensive with those of adults. The problem is inevitably one of
reaching the proper balance,'26 and it is the difficulty of establishing this
balance which led to the three separate opinions in the Second Circuit,2' and,
of course, to the failure of the Supreme Court to provide satisfactory guidance
to boards of education regarding the scope of their authority.
D. The Supreme Court Decision
1. Analysis of the Plurality Opinion
Justice Brennan authored the plurality opinion which affirmed the Sec-
ond Circuit's remand for trial. He was joined in the opinion by Justices Mar-
shall and Stevens. He began his analysis by noting the constitutional limits
upon the state's power to control even curriculum and classroom activities.'28
He then stressed how narrowly drawn the issue before the Court was - it in-
volved only the removal, not the acquisition, of books from the school library,
and there was no question about interference with school curriculum.2 9
Justice Brennan recognized that "school boards have broad discretion in
the management of school affairs,"'' 0 and that "there is a legitimate and
substantial community interest in promoting respect for authority and tradi-
tional values be they social, moral, or political."'' Nevertheless, he noted that
"the discretion of the States and local school boards in matters of education
must be exercised in a manner that comports with the transcendent im-
peratives of the First Amendment."'3 He quoted Tinker that students do not
"shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
2ld. at 412, quoting from Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 12d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, Cent.
School Dist. v. Thomas 444 U.S. 1081 (1980).
"'For a discussion of the proper theoretical framework with which to address the balancing of school board
authority with students' first amendment rights, see Comment. A Definitional Approach to Secondary
School Students Right to Know. 42 Ohio St. L.J. 1025 (1981).
"'It is interesting to compare the Second Circuit's decision in Pico with the contrary result reached the same
day in Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Directors, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980). In Bicknell
each member of the same panel which decided Pico also wrote a separate opinion in this case.
12457 U.S. at 861. citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968) for authority.
12457 U.S. at 861-62. The removal of The Fixer from the twelfth grade curriculum was challenged at the
district court level, but was not an issue on appeal. See 474 F. Supp. at 397.
12457 U.S. at 863.




McCann: School Board Authority
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1985
AKRON LAW REVIEW
schoolhouse gate.""' Thus, he laid out the usual parameters for balancing the
interests in these student First Amendment cases.
However, the plurality then set down its premise for finding a First
Amendment violation in school library removal cases, a premise with which no
other opinion of the court agreed' - that students have a constitutional right
to receive ideas.'35 Justice Brennan cited authority for this right in a long line of
Supreme Court cases establishing the First Amendment "right to access" or
"right to know" in other contexts.'36 In fact, the concept had already been ap-
plied in library removal cases, notably by the Sixth Circuit in Minarcini v.
Strongsville City School District.'37
The plurality found that in two ways the right to receive ideas was "an in-
herent corollary of the rights of free speech and press that are explicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution."'38 First, there had to be a right to receive
ideas to make the sender's right of expression meaningful. Otherwise, "lilt
would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers."'
Secondly, "the right to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the recipient's
meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political
freedom."' ' The plurality pointed out that this is important because our
system of popular government depends on citizen access to information in
order to function properly.
The potential breadth of this right of students to know articulated by the
plurality may have frightened even Justice Brennan. Perhaps, that is why he
id. at 865 quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
-It is unclear whether Justice White would accept the concept of a students' right to receive ideas since his
opinion argued that the First Amendment issues should never have been addressed until after a trial on the
merits. Id. at 883-84 (White J., concurring).
'"Id. at 866.
"lid. at 866-67. The key cases given by the plurality were First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); on remand Stanley v. State, 225 Ga. 273, 167 S.E.2d 756 (1969);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); and
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
Two other key cases identified by commentators as critical for establishing the student's "right to know"
were not cited in the body of the plurality's opinion. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), was
relegated to a footnote, 457 U.S. at 867 n. 20, while perhaps the most important case in the area, Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), was not cited at all. It
may be that this failure to cite is more than an oversight. Both Justice Blackmun, the author of Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy, and Justice Powell, the author of Martinez, rejected the student right to know con-
cept proposed by the plurality in Pico.
For commentary discussing the right to know concept see 57 U. Det. J. Urb. L., supra note 3; Comment,
"Board of Education v. Pico:" School Library Book Removal and the First Amendment. 14 St. Mary's L.J.
1063, 1074-79 (1983); Note, First Amendment Limitations on the Power of School Boards to Select and
Remove High School Text and Library Books. 52 St. John's L. Rev. 457, 467-74 (1978); Recent
Developments, Removal of Public School Library Books: The First Amendment Versus the Local School
Board, 34 Vand. L. Rev. 1407 (1981).
"'541 F.2d 577 passion (6th Cir. 1976).
"'457 U.S. at 867.
"'Id., quoting from Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
11ld. (emphasis in the original).
[Vol. 18:2
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was so careful at the outset of his opinion to delineate precisely the limits of his
decision. Later, he stressed that the school library was an "environment
especially appropriate for the recognition of the First Amendment rights of
students,"'' and then contrasted it with curriculum. While a school board was
not entitled to "unfettered discretion" with respect to the library, Justice Bren-
nan suggested that Board members "might well defend their claim of absolute
discretion in matters of curriculum by reliance upon their duty to inculcate
community values."'' This dictum indicating that school boards have absolute
discretion in matters of curriculum goes further than any of the other opinions
in Pico were willing to go and is certainly a surprising admission in Justice
Brennan's decision.
After recognizing the uniqueness of the school library as a home for ideas
where selection of books by students is by free choice, the plurality did concede
that boards of education "have a substantial legitimate role to play in the deter-
mination of school library content."'4 3 However, they may not "prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion."'" To determine if the students' first amendment rights had been infr-
inged, the plurality focused upon the motivation of the board in removing the
books. If they "intended by their removal decision to deny [the students] access
to ideas with which [they] disagreed, and if this intent was the decisive factor in
[their] decision, then [they] have exercised their discretion in violation of the
Constitution."'4 5 However, as the dissent of Justice Rehnquist points out,"4
this motivation test is particularly inappropriate given the plurality's emphasis
on a student right to access. Both good and bad motives equally deny students
their right of access. Similarly, the plurality's distinction between removal of
books and failure to acquire them appears equally fallacious. If students have a
right to receive ideas in the school library, it would seem violated in either case.
Despite these logical inconsistencies, Justice Brennan did, at least, provide
some permissive motivations for removals of library books. Books might be
removed if their pervasive vulgarity or educational unsuitablity were the
decisive motivations of the board. 4' These motivations "would not carry the
danger of an official suppression of ideas, and thus would not violate
[students'] First Amendment rights.' 4 8
"'ld. at 868.
"l2d. at 869. (emphasis in the original).
1'31d.
'"Id. at 870, quoting from West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
1'1d. at 871 (emphasis in the original).
'1Id. at 904 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Id. at 885 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
"lid. at 871.
'"Id. One wonders how the motivation test employed by the plurality based upon Mt. Healthy City School
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274(1977), would be applied. Is it the motivation of the board as an of-
ficial body or that of some or all of its members that is to be analyzed?
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Examining the facts in Pico, the plurality decided to affirm the Second
Circuit's decision that there were material facts in dispute which required a
trial. The issue of the defendants' motives was called into question by the
board's refusal to listen to the advice of its professional staff or book review
committee, their reliance upon an outside organization's assertions about the
books, and their "highly irregular and ad hoc" removal procedure. "9
2. Analysis of the Concurring Opinions
The decision to affirm the Second Circuit was concurred in by Justices
White and Blackmun. Justice White argued that the issue should go to trial
before the Court entered into an unnecessary "dissertation" on first amend-
ment rights. 50 Justice Blackmun, on the other hand, did address the first
amendment issue to provide what is in many ways the most coherent and
logical analysis of the problem.
Justice Blackmun rejected both the plurality's concept of a student right
to receive ideas and the artificial distinction between the school library and the
other phases of the educational process. 5' He also seemed to recognize that the
school's indoctrinative function must often prevail over student claims of con-
stitutional deprivations. He framed the balancing problem this way:
[Tihe question in this case is how to make the delicate accommodation be-
tween the limited constitutional restriction that I think is imposed by the
First Amendment, and the necessarily broad state authority to regulate
education. In starker terms, we must reconcile the schools' "inculcative"
function with the First Amendment's bar on "prescriptions of
orthodoxy."''
Following a more traditional first amendment analysis than the plurality,
Justice Blackmun determined that "school officials may not remove books for
the purpose of restricting access to the political ideas or social perspectives dis-
cussed in them, when that action is motivated simply by the officials' disap-
proval of the ideas involved."'' 3 While this is a motivational approach, it avoids
the problems created by Justice Brennan's'54 and Circuit Judge Newman's 55
analyses.
The plurality's analysis of motivation was illogical, because the focus was
on the students' right to access. Good or bad motives would equally deny this
'"Ild. at 875.
"'Id. at 883. (White, J., concurring).
11id. at 878-79 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
'
521d. at 879.
"lid. 879-80. (emphasis in the original).
"'See supra notes 145-146 and accompanying text.
"'See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 18:2
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right. Judge Newman's call for an analysis of motivation was also flawed
because of his concentration on the perceptions of the students when faced
with a book removal. A good or bad motive would not change their perception
that ideas were being suppressed.
Justice Blackmun, however, avoided these problems by focusing initially
on the school board's purpose and motivation. Thus, the first amendment
rights of the students are only defined by examining the purpose and motives
of the would-be violators. This approach is best adapted to the key role that
school boards play as indoctrinators of community values. As long as board
members act with the purpose and motive of carrying out their proper indoc-
trinative functions, student rights are not infringed, but in fact are enhanced as
they are receiving the public education needed to prepare them for effective en-
joyment of their rights as citizens in the future. When school board members
act with the impermissible purpose and motive of prescribing orthodoxy by
suppression of ideas, then student rights are violated. The board is no longer
serving its proper function of education, but is using its position to impose its
own political and social perspective upon its charges. The students have there-
by had their first amendment rights infringed in two respects. First, they have
had a "pall of orthodoxy" imposed upon them, and, secondly, they have been
denied the education they need for full enjoyment of those rights in the future.
Justice Blackmun was careful to note that his purpose test was a "narrow
principle" and that school board officials must have broad discretion to choose
books for any "politically neutral" reason.'56 This would include a refusal to
make a book available "because it contains offensive language or because it is
psychologically or intellectually inappropriate for the age group, or even,
perhaps, because the ideas it advances are 'manifestly inimical to the public
welfare."'"5 This appears to be a much lower standard for school board book
removals than the "pervasively vulgar" and "educationally unsuitable" stan-
dard of the plurality.'
3. Analysis of the Dissenting Opinions
There were four dissenting opinions in Pico, yet they all stressed the same
theme - deference to the local control of schools by elected officials. Chief
Justice Burger, in a clever turn of phrase given the facts of the case, accused
the plurality of refashioning the Court into a "super censor" of school board
library decisions.'59 He attacked the plurality's creation of a right of access as
merely a means for the Court's imposition of its own views about what books
should be made available to students.1° He argued that schools had no affir-
111457 U.S. at 880.
"'Id.. quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 268 U.S. 510, 534 11925).
"'Id. at 871.
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mative duty to provide information and that Tinker's holding only set limits
upon school officials prohibiting student expression.' 6' Like Justice Rehnquist,
the Chief Justice pointed out the illogical distinctions in the plurality opinion
between removal and acquisition, and between library books and textbooks in
terms of the asserted right to receive ideas. 62 He noted that in any case the
students had access to these ideas in other forums besides the school library.163
The Chief Justice also rejected the criteria suggested by the plurality for
book removal determinations. He found "educational suitability" to be a "stan-
dardless phrase," and could not accept the view that vulgarity had to be "per-
vasive" before book removal would be proper. 64 In addition, he renounced the
plurality for failing to define what it meant in deciding that a board could not
act in a "political manner.' 65 School boards as elected bodies must of necessity
act in a political manner in some sense of the word.
Justice Powell's dissenting opinion stressed the key fact that local boards
of education are the most representative of all our government institutions.'6
He feared that student rights litigation would "corrode the school board's
authority and effectiveness.' 67 He also rejected the right to know concept and
pointed to the opinions of the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist for
demonstrations of the plurality's contradictions in recognizing this new
right.'68 Moreover, like the Chief Justice, Justice Powell attacked the plurality
view that "school board's 'discretion may not be exercised in a narrowly par-
tisan and political manner' as no more than a "standardless standard.' '69
Finally, to emphasize what he considered the vulgarity of the works in ques-
tion, he attached as an appendix Circuit Judge Mansfield's summary of ex-
cerpts of the books at issue.
Justice Rehnquist's incisive dissent underscores all the inconsistencies and
fallacies in the plurality opinion. Unfortunately, it fails to suggest an effective
alternative for balancing the competing interests in these cases beyond its
helpful distinction between the state as sovereign and the state as educator. "
For a viable framework for balancing the interests in the book removal cases,
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As mentioned above in the discussion of the plurality decision, Justice
Rehnquist pointed out in his opinion that there can be no logical distinction
between a failure to acquire books and their removal from the library
shelves.' Nor is there any real difference between the library and other parts
of the school. Elementary and secondary schools exist to serve a inculcatory
function, and school libraries serve as supplements to this inculcatory role -
"they are tailored, as the public school curriculum is tailored, to the teaching of
basic skills and ideas."'73
Justice Rehnquist emphasized that not only was Justice Brennan's finding
of a student right of access to ideas unsupported by the Court's prior
decisions,' but that such a right was contrary to the school's indoctrinative
function.'75
Education consists of the selective presentation and explanation of ideas.
The effective acquisition of knowledge depends upon an orderly exposure
to relevant information. Nowhere is this more true than in elementary
and secondary schools, where, unlike the broad-ranging inquiry available
to university students, the courses taught are those thought most relevant
to the young students' individual development. Of necessity, elementary
and secondary educators must separate the relevant from the irrelevant,
the appropriate from the inappropriate. Determining what information
not to present to the students is often as important as identifying relevant
material. This winnowing process necessarily leaves much information to
be discovered by students at another time or in another place, and is fun-
damentally inconsistent with any constitutionally required eclecticism in
public education. 7 6
Addressing the motive test of the plurality, Justice Rehnquist argued that
it was basically inconsistent with the right to know analysis. As was noted
above,' "bad motives and good motives alike deny access to the books re-
moved."'' If there is a right to receive information, the reason for the denial
should be irrelevant.
After his dissection of the plurality opinion, Justice Rehnquist suggested
adopting a test for student first amendment rights cases from Tinker.'79 In
Tinker it was stated that "prohibition of expression of one particular opinion,
at least without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial
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interference with school work or discipline, is not constitutionally
permissible.' ' 10 Applying this test in Pico, Justice Rehnquist argued that the
board may have suppressed vulgarity and profanity, but the ideas were not
suppressed as the books could still be discussed by teachers and students.'' It is
submitted, however, that the Rehnquist test is too weak to protect adequately
the first amendment rights of students. Justice Rehnquist's point that there is
no suppression if there is no prohibition on classroom discussion ignores the
coercive elements of book banning and its chilling effect on first amendment
rights.
Justice O'Connor penned a terse dissent.1 2 She noted that since school
board's authority included the power to set curriculum and make initial deter-
minations of school library content, it also extended to decisions to remove li-
brary books absent any further interference with the students' rights to read
and discuss the material.' 3 She accepted Justice Rehnquist's distinction be-
tween the government's roles as sovereign and as educator."4 Finally, she
joined the Chief Justice in the view that these educational decisions were prop-
erly made by the elected board members, not by the courts.8 5
IV. SCHOOL BOARD AUTHORITY AFTER PIco
The Supreme Court's fractured holding in Pico did not make as broad an
inroad into school board authority as the decision of the Second Circuit had.
Even the Court's plurality opinion refused to strap local boards to the complex
procedural guidelines outlined in Judge Sifton's analysis.'" This leaves signifi-
cant room for the exercise of discretion by school boards. Nonetheless, the
plurality's recognition of a right to receive ideas could pose a substantial threat
to the indoctrinative functions of secondary and elementary education. While
this recognition has no stare decisis effect, one can expect the concept to reap-
pear in later students' rights cases. At present, however, the right to know has
been severely limited, even by the plurality, to the shelves of the school library.
The really crucial point to analyze in future student first amendment
rights cases will be the motivation of the school board. This concept had the
support of Justice Blackmun as well as the plurality. In fact, most of the
assaults upon the principle by the dissents were narrowly directed at its incom-
patibility with the plurality's notion of a limited right to receive ideas.
All of the justices recognized the indoctrinative role of local school boards
"'Id. at 511.
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and the necessary limits this must place on students' first amendment rights.
All agreed that books that are educationally unsuitable can be removed as can
books that are vulgar. The degree of vulgarity necessary for removal, however,
remains unsettled since the plurality's requirement of "pervasive vulgarity"
was rejected by the rest of the Court. There was a great deal of disagreement
on whether books could be removed for "political" reasons, but most criticism
centered on a failure to define the term. Nevertheless, there seems to be
substantial agreement in the Court that school boards cannot suppress a par-
ticular political or social perspective unless it poses a threat to society or to the
indoctrinative function of education.
In general terms, the Pico Court appeared to reject any concept that
school children are tiny constitutional entities who must be afforded rights
coextensive with adults. Given the severe limits even the plurality placed on
the right to know concept, the justices seemed to recognize a basic constitu-
tional difference between adults and children. The recognition of this basic dif-
ference is revealed in the substantial agreement of the Court as to the impor-
tance of the indoctrinative role of education. Thus, while Pico may have been
one small constitutional step toward an appreciation of students' first amend-
ment rights, in many ways it is more significant for its broad reaffirmation of
local school board authority.
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